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ARTICLES
CARTE BLANCHE: FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF
STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS AFTER SABRI
George D. Brown+
INTRODUCTION

In July of 2004, the State of Maryland was rocked by a political
controversy that reached the highest levels of the Federal Department of
Justice. In a front page story, The Baltimore Sun revealed that the U.S.
attorney for Maryland, Thomas DiBiagio, told his staff that he wanted
three "front page" white collar or public corruption indictments by
November 6.' Since that date is close to Election Day, critics were quick
to charge him with politicizing the investigation and prosecution of
public corruption cases.' The Washington Post thundered that DiBiagio
had "given the appearance of an excessive, irresponsible prosecutorial
zeal to bring down prominent officials regardless of the evidence."3 In an
extraordinary rebuke, the Department of Justice made public a letter
from the Deputy Attorney General directing DiBiagio "until further
notice, to submit to [the Deputy Attorney General]
for review any
4
proposed indictment in a public corruption matter.,
One of the surprising aspects of the controversy is that anyone was
terribly surprised. The local U.S. attorney is, potentially, a major
political actor in every state. The Federal Government prosecutes state7
and local officials all the time," sometimes in politically charged contexts.
' Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, Harvard
University, LL.B. 1965, Harvard Law School. A grant from the Carney Fund at Boston
College Law School provided research support. A version of this Article was presented at
the 2004 Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association. Many helpful
comments were received.
1. Doug Donovan, DiBiagio Voices Frustrationover Pace of Top Cases, BALT. SUN,
July 15, 2004, at 1A.
2. See id.
3. A Vote of No Confidence, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at A16.
4. Doug Donovan, DiBiagio Gets Formal Rebuke from His Boss, BALT. SUN, July
17, 2004, at lA.
5. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine:
Someone To Watch over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 175-76 (1994) (referring to "[t]he
power federal prosecutors exercise over the political affairs of states and cities").
6.

See, e.g., PUB. INTEGRITY SECTION,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

REPORT TO

CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION
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Totally apart from possible political dimensions, these prosecutions raise
8
serious questions of constitutional federalism. In Sabri v. United States
the Supreme Court managed to avoid almost every one of them, while
upholding federal prosecution of a routine local bribery scheme. In the
process, it issued a unanimous decision that seems both to confirm the
national role in policing state and local officials and to cast doubt on the
depth of the Court's commitment to any "New Federalism."9 One
explanation for this apparent paradox is that the Court's commitment to
the precept is far from firm. An alternative perspective emphasizes the
fact that the defendant was convicted under a statute passed pursuant to
the spending power'-the federal program bribery statute." The Court
has suggested that spending power statutes are exempt from whatever
strictures the New Federalism imposes. 2
In this Article, I offer a third perspective. Sabri confirms the high
priority that the Court places on the National Government's authority to
fight corruption at any level in order to protect the democratic process
and public confidence in it. The key Supreme Court decision for
understanding Sabri is one issued the same Term: McConnell v. FEC3 the "Campaign Finance Reform" decision. There, the Court held that
the governmental interest in combatting corruption outweighs the
powerful First Amendment interests at play in the political process. 4 In
Sabri, the Court could be seen as holding that this same governmental
FOR 2002, at 37-38 tbl.2 (2002), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.coml
1 AR Final 2002.pdf. According to this table, 971 state and local officials were classified
as indicted, convicted, or awaiting trial in 2002. Id.; see also George D. Brown, New
Federalism's Unanswered Question: Who Should Prosecute State and Local Officials for
PoliticalCorruption?,60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 421 (2003) (summarizing twenty-year
totals for these categories); Lolita C. Baldor, Feds Take Aim at Government Corruption,
NC TIMES.COM, http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/12/25/news/nation/13-43_5512 24
04.txt (last modified Dec. 24, 2004) (indicating a heightened focus by the Department of
Justice on federal corruption prosecutions).
7.

NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS

ENFORCEMENT 147 (3d ed. 2000) (noting "potential for politically motivated
prosecutions"); see also Michael Powell, Scandals Plague Governor, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 8, 2004, at A5, http://www.boston.comnews/politics/governors/articles/2004/08/08/
scandals-plaguegovernor. The Democratic governor of New Jersey and his aides have
charged that corruption prosecutions by a Republican U.S. attorney are aimed at
furthering his own political career. Id.
8. 124 S.Ct. 1941 (2004).
9. See generally Brown, supra note 6, at 421-28 (discussing interaction between
federal corruption prosecutions and "New Federalism" precepts).
1.
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000).
12. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 172-73 (1992).
13. 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003).
14. !d. at 660-61.
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interest outweighs powerful federalism arguments in favor of letting state
and local governments prosecute their own officials. In a sense, the 2003
Term was the Anti-Corruption Term. The Court showed sensitivity to
the national mood of concern over abuse of power, and distrust of
politicians and their susceptibility to corruptive influences.
True, the contexts of the two cases are different. So are their contents.
McConnell dealt at length with constitutional arguments against an array
of restrictions on campaign-related activity and its financing.15 There
were definite splits among the justices. 6 Sabri is the product of a
unanimous Court. 17 The analysis barely touches on the constitutional
problems raised by the particular statutory issue presented. Indeed, the
reasoning seems almost simplistic, as developed below. What unites the
two cases, however, is a concern for integrity, both in the political process
itself and the governmental process that follows it.
Sabri looks like a run-of-the-mill bribery prosecution. The defendant,
a developer, had allegedly offered kickbacks and other inducements to a
city councilor to facilitate a proposed project. 8 However, like many
other prosecutions of state and local officials, Sabri was brought by
federal officials in a federal court1 9 The statute which authorized this
criminal proceeding is 18 U.S.C. § 666: the federal program bribery
statute-sometimes referred to as the "Stealth Statute," or the "Beast in
the Federal Criminal Arsenal." 20 It applies to any entity, including
governments, that receives more than $10,000 a year in federal benefits. 2'
Within such an entity, numerous acts are made federal crimes. This case
involved the portion of the statute that imposes federal criminal liability
on anyone who
corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any
person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an
organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or
any agency thereof, in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization,

15. Id. at 643-76 (discussing issue advocacy).
16. E.g., id. at 720-29 (Scalia, J., concurring with respect to BCRA Titles III and IV,
and concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title

11).
17. Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1944 (2004).
18. Id. at 1944-45.
19. Id.
20. See George D. Brown, Stealth Statute-Corruption,the Spending Power, and the
Rise of 18 U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247 (1998); Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note,
The Beast in the FederalCriminal Arsenal, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 673 (1990).

21.

18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000).
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government or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or
more.22
Under this language, it makes no difference whether any federal funds
are involved in or connected to the proscribed transaction. Once an
entity is covered, the specified corrupt acts within it are federal crimes.
In Sabri, the Supreme Court considered, and rejected, arguments that
some nexus to federal funds ought to be required.23 This issue had
divided the lower courts.24 For the Court, however, the crucial
determinant was the National Government's ability to protect funds it
had disbursed under the spending power by ensuring the integrity of the
recipient of those funds.25
The broad sweep of § 666 did not bother the Court at all. Indeed, this
breadth turns § 666 into something of a national anti-corruption statute.
Such a statute has long been the holy grail of federal prosecutors. 26
Perhaps they already have it. Still, if Sabri has, in fact, irrevocably tilted
the debate on federal anti-corruption efforts in a nationalist direction,
there may be more plausible and direct methods to reach this result,
other than the rationale of somehow protecting federal funds. If fighting
corruption at all levels of government is part of the National
Government's role in the American federal system, why not come out
and say so?
Section I of the Article deals with the underlying debate about the
desirability of national prosecution of corrupt state and local officials. In
particular, the analysis considers whether one can reconcile the
widespread phenomenon of such prosecutions with the tenets of the New
Federalism, while recognizing that there may be alternative justifications
for a broad national role. Section II moves from the policy debate to its
constitutional underpinnings. This Section first considers whether the
Constitution itself speaks authoritatively to the question of corruption
and, possibly, contains provisions that direct government to prevent
corruption. This Section also considers the more modest question of
whether the grants of power to the National Government can be read as
permitting it to attack corruption at sub-national levels. With this
background, Section III of the Article examines and critiques the Sabri
decision at some length. In particular, the contention is made that the
Court glossed over serious questions of constitutional law and statutory
22. Id. § 666(a)(2).
23.
24.

Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1945-46.
Id. at 1945.

25. Id. at 1947.
26. See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 268-71 (discussing issues
surrounding enactment of "a new federal statute aimed explicitly at state and local
political corruption").
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construction to arrive, seemingly, at the conclusion that protection of
federal funds trumps any other consideration. Nonetheless, it is helpful
to view the decision in tandem with that of the earlier released complex
set of opinions in McConnell. McConnell establishes that the prevention
of corruption or the appearance thereof goes a long way toward
supplying whatever governmental interest is necessary to justify
restrictionsclaion campaign
activity, even
Amndmet
toFirs
•27 though such activity has a strong
claim to First Amendment protection.
In other words, preventing
corruption is seen by the Court as an essential function of the National
Government. Such a view of national authority would justify a general
federal anti-corruption statute. It may be that § 666 in its present form
represents such a statute. Section IV of the Article, nonetheless,
examines alternative rationales for upholding such a general statute,
including an alternative rationale under the spending power itself. The
conclusion of the Article is that Sabri represents a missed opportunity to
make a contribution to an important debate about the nature of the
American federal system. Nonetheless, the decision stands. Perhaps,
then, it answers many of the questions previously raised about the
national role in fighting corruption at all levels. Whether or not § 666 is
the long-sought general statute, it certainly comes close.
Thus,
McConnell and Sabri can be seen as two important steps down the road
toward more vigorous anti-corruption efforts.
I.

PROSECUTING CORRUPTION AND THE NEW FEDERALISM DEBATE

A. Defining Corruption

A first step is to define corruption. Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman
focuses on the unwarranted intrusion of the private marketplace into the
"democratic political system that grants a formal equality to each
citizen's vote. 28 In discussing "corruption as an economic problem,"2' 9
she states the problem as follows:
Payments are corrupt if they are illegally made to public agents
with the goal of obtaining a benefit or avoiding a cost.
Corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong in the
management of the state. Institutions designed to govern the
27.

28.
(1978).
29.

McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 660-61 (2003).
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 1

SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 7 (1999).
Thus, in describing the chapter on "The

Economic Impact of Corruption," she states that "[t]his chapter isolates the most
important situations where widespread corruption can determine who obtains the benefits

and bears the costs of government action." Id. at 9.
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interrelationships between the citizen and the state are used
instead for personal enrichment and the provision of benefits to
the corrupt. The price mechanism, so often a source of
economic efficiency and a contributor to growth, can, in the
form of bribery, undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of
government.30
However, it is possible to put forward broader definitions of
corruption that focus on the officeholder, not the relationship between
that individual and some third party attempting to affect/alter
government decisions. One such definition includes "nepotism (bestowal
of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit) and
misappropriation (the illegal appropriation of public resources for
private-regarding uses)."31

Here the emphasis is on improper rent

seeking.
B. Corruptionat the NationalLevel

Whatever the definition of corruption, one can postulate several
reasons why the National Government might want to proscribe such
behavior in its own ranks. The basic argument can be seen in the
President's oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States."3 A democratic government has the inherent power,
indeed the duty, to preserve the democratic system and the line it
establishes between public and private "markets" for allocating goods
and services.33 Closely related to this argument is the contention that
preventing corruption is essential to preserving public confidence and
participation in the democratic process.3' One finds this contention in
numerous Supreme Court cases, primarily in the area of Campaign
Finance Reform, where the anti-corruption imperative has been
dominant.35 The contention has also played a key role in upholding
30. Id.
31. ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 7 n.10 (quoting J.S. Nye, Corruption and
Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 417 (1967),
reprinted in ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 567 (1970)).

32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
33. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at 114.
34. See, e.g., Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal
Prosecutionsof State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 486 (1989).
35. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) ("[T]he
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of
voters to take part in democratic governance."). Political scientists have disputed this
contention. See Kelli Lammie & Nathaniel Persily, Perceptions of Corruption and
Campaign Finance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law (June 14, 2004)

(unpublished manuscript), http://lsr.nellco.org/egi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=
upennlwps; see also E-mail from Professor David Primo, Assistant Professor of Political
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conflict of interest legislation.36 In each context, the concept of the mere
appearance of corruption or impropriety plays a large role in attempting
to assess the impact of behavior on public attitudes towards the system as
a whole.
Arguments based on improper incursion of the private market
mechanism into the public sector include considerations of efficiency. As
Professor Rose-Ackerman puts it:
[Clorruption can create inefficiencies and inequities and is, at
best, inferior to legally established payment schemes. Reforms
can reduce the incentives for bribery and increase the risks of
corruption. The goal is not the elimination of corruption, but
an improvement in the overall efficiency, fairness, and
legitimacy of the state.37
Obviously, the National Government has a strong concern with the
efficiency of its own operations. The view of corruption as improper rent
seeking suggests additional considerations that the National Government
might take into account in policing corruption in its own ranks. Like any
employer, government can determine and limit the compensation of its
employees. Beyond compensation, the government may wish to instill
among its employees an imperative of honest public services. Professor
Robert G. Vaughn advocates "a 'public service' vision of public
employment-a vision containing a number of elements, but advocating
the political neutrality of public employees and a role morality based on
self-restraint as an ethical principle. 38 On a more basic level, such
corrupt actions as embezzlement or theft may simply constitute crimes
that the Government is entitled to prosecute in any context, regardless of
the happenstance of its status as victim.
C. Sub-national Corruption
However, when assessing the National Government's interests in
preventing corruption at the state and local levels, many of these
justifications largely disappear. What concern is it to Washington if
Smallville is inefficient, lax on ethical standards, and even allows
employees to supplement their salaries through liberal use of municipal
Science, University of Rochester (Sept. 3, 2003, 09:18:00 EST) (on file with the author)
("In the statistical work I have done, there is virtually zero evidence that campaign finance
laws or campaign spending have an influence on confidence in government.").
36. See United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961) ("[A]
democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is
bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which
arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.").

37.
38.

RoSE-ACKERMAN, supra

note 29, at 4.

Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public Service, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 418 (1990).
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property and funds? As long as no federal funds are involved, it is hard

to see any damage to the Federal Government from this behavior, or any
federal interest in preventing it. Several answers suggest themselves that
might demonstrate a federal interest. The first is that the conduct of all
government officials is something the public views in unitary terms,
regardless of the level at which it occurs. Thus, corruption at any level
can undermine confidence in the system as a whole.39

Prosecuting state and local government is thus only another example
of the fundamental national role of acting to preserve the democratic
system. The argument has an intuitive appeal but seems short on
empirical justification, although it is true that in other societies public
perceptions of corruption have undermined confidence in basic
governmental institutions. 4 Nonetheless, the anti-corruption imperative
present in both McConnell and Sabri may reflect the Court's sense of a
need for a response to a widespread public perception that "they are all
crooks." Other national interests can be postulated to justify corruption
prosecutions of state and local officials. It may be that interstate
externalities are present. Corruption in, say, industrial permitting in
state A may harm the rigor and integrity of the permitting process in
state B. This seems an example of the familiar race to the bottom
argument as a justification for national intervention." One might view
the role of the Federal Government as ensuring a fair balance in the
competitive environment among the states generally. Still, most state
and local corruption seems to lack any clear interstate dimension. Of
course, other additional federal interests may be present depending on
the context. For example, local police corruption can threaten joint
federal-state law enforcement in such areas as drug offenses and antiterrorism efforts.42 Widespread economic failure of local governments
might have national repercussions. Alternatively, acts of corruption such
as bribery may again be viewed as simply crimes, as in the context of
transgressions by federal level officials. This is true, but does not
demonstrate any federal interest in these crimes beyond the general
federal interest in enacting a broad range of criminal statutes-a practice

39. See Kurland, supra note 34, at 377. Professor Kurland states that "the public is
entitled to honest government at all levels. The faith that the citizenry places in all levels
of government is the foundation of the republic. Thus, anything that erodes that
foundation is of substantial federal interest." Id.
40. See, e.g., Juan Forero, Latin America Graft and Poverty Trying Patience with
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at Al.
41. For a brief summary of the "race to the bottom argument," see GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219-20 (4th ed. 2001).
42. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 20, at 260.
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that has come under considerable attack given our system's supposed
assumptions about the primacy of the states in defining the criminal law. 3
Bribery, and similar attempts at distorting outcomes reached through
political processes, may present a special justification for federal
intervention. If corruption leads to inequality in the provision of public
goods and services, a national role somewhat similar to the protection of
civil rights may be justified." At some level, extreme state and local
corruption might lead to a breakdown in particular governmental units.45
Perhaps the Guarantee Clause46 justifies federal intervention in such
extreme cases, but that seems different from the run-of-the mill-if
sometimes glamorous-federal prosecutions of state and local officials
for a wide range of misconduct. In sum, there are plausible arguments
for the current phenomenon of extensive federal prosecution of state and
local officials for political corruption. However, these arguments are
hardly overwhelming. Federal interests can be postulated, but they are
far from self-evident. More to the point, arguments in favor of the
federal prosecutions run directly counter to the notions of state
autonomy, sovereignty, and dignity that the current Court has often
articulated, and which have come to be referred to as its New
Federalism. 7
D. (New) Federalism Concerns

Much has been written about the clash between federalism values and
the large scale of anti-corruption prosecutions under discussion here.41
The criticism of the federal role in prosecuting state and local officials
predates many of the Court's recent New Federalism decisions. Writing
in 1994, Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr summed up much of that
critique of the federal prosecutorial role, contending that the impairment
of state and local decision making
is a result of the phenomenon that federal prosecutions for
political corruption make state and local officials more
43. See George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate:
Morrison, Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, passim (2001); TASK FORCE ON
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASs'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF

CRIMINAL LAW 24-26 (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/fedreport.html.
See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 64-72 (outlining the debate over the
proper scope of federal criminal law).
44. See Brown, supra note 6, at 489-91 (discussing civil rights rationale).
45. See id. at 487.
46. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
47. On the New Federalism, see generally Calvin Massey, Federalism and the
Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002).
48. See, e.g., Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial Decree:
The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137 (1990).
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accountable to an extrinsic entity, the Federal Government,
than to those who voted for them. An interventionist federal
presence encourages citizens to abdicate their responsibility for
self-government at the state and local levels. The ultimate
result is a diminished demand on state and local legislative and
executive branches to control political corruption. The power
federal prosecutors exercise over the political affairs of states
and cities is particularly troublesome in the area of criminal
legislation, in which states traditionally have the "principal
responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes."49
The Supreme Court's emphasis on federalism in cases such as United
States v. Lopez-5° and its recent Eleventh Amendment decisions"' seem to
fortify that critique. The essence of the New Federalism is two-fold: an
emphasis on the Constitution's enumeration of powers as limiting the
powers of the National Government; and, the concept of states as quasisovereign, largely autonomous entities owed great respect by the coequal National Government.52 For that government to usurp from
another government entity the quintessentially sovereign task of
controlling its own officials seems totally at variance with what the Court
has been saying. It is true that no Supreme Court case has ever discussed
at length the proper federal role in prosecuting state and local
corruption. Justice Thomas questioned it in a dissent,53 and a brief
reference in Fischer v. United States" invokes the federal-state balance in
prosecuting bribery. 55 But even without explicit guidance, the logic of
federalism, old and new, seems to cut sharply against the practice of
widespread prosecution of sub-national officials.
E. Beyond TraditionalFederalism

In a recent paper on corruption and federalism, Professor Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., has made a significant contribution that takes the debate
beyond traditional federalism considerations. He offers a "cautiously
pessimistic answer" to the question of whether federal prosecutions are
56
His overall
likely to improve sub-national units of government.
49. Moohr, supra note 5. State and local accountability is a major theme of New
Federalism decisions. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-30 (1997).
50. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
51. E.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
52. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47, 54, 72, 76.
53. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54. 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
55. See id. at 681.
56. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruptionand Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal
Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 113, 114

(2005).
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contention is that "these prosecutions could impose on non-federal
governments federal conflict-of-interest rules that are fundamentally
inconsistent with the style of democracy that flourishes at the non-federal
level." 7
Professor Hills first characterizes the democratic values followed at the
federal level as "'bureaucratic populism.' '' 8 The model is that of a
central legislature laying down values and policies which are then
implemented by professional bureaucrats whose principal fidelity is to
those values. Thus, those officials must be "insulated from private
interests that might divert their judgment from national values,"5 9 and
reined in by such techniques as a civil service system and extensive
conflict of interest rules. In contrast to the bureaucratic populism of the
National Government, Professor Hills paints the following portrait of the
"participatory populism" that predominates at the sub-national level:
Participatory populism rejects [the] separation of public and
private spheres, instead mixing professional and lay decisionmaking. The elected legislators are often-indeed, usuallypart-time, under-paid officers with substantial private interests
in the community. The administrative officers who carry out
legislative policy are also usually lay people who serve part-time
on supervisory bodies like planning commissions and school
boards. They, too, have full-time private interests. This whole
structure of lay decision-making is pervasively subjected to
neighborhood, municipal, and state-wide plebiscites, allowing
private citizens to sit as a kind of a super-legislature. In short,
the entire system of participatory populism is designed to
maximize private access to public-decision making,
promiscuously mingling public and private interests in the
process. 60
Professor Hills argues that the federal corruption prosecutions run the
risk of imposing one level's set of values on the other without full
appreciation of the costs. He discusses at length the application of the
"honest services" theory under the mail fraud statute in circumstances
where the federal conflict-of-interest rules might better be put aside to
respect the norms that had already been developed under state law.6'
Clearly, Hills's piece is an important contribution to the debate. He
takes that debate beyond formal considerations of New Federalism

57. Id.
58. Id. at 114-15.
59. Id. at 115.
60. Id.
61. Id, at 137-44.
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versus a Garcia-based view of the system to examine the real-world
impact.63 He also shifts focus away from the phenomenon of
enforcement to the content of the underlying norms.6 One can, of
course, take issue with aspects of his piece. For example, federal
prosecution for hardcore forms of corruption, such as bribery and
extortion, may not represent imposition of differing norms. It is also
possible that the overall division between the two sets of norms is not as
clear as he would have it, given the ongoing efforts at professionalization
of state and local governments, and the fact that they may use federal
ethics precepts as models for their own development of rules governing
officials.6 Nonetheless, Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal
Criminal Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy? interposes yet

one more objection to the arguments in favor of automatic acceptance of
the national role in prosecuting state and local corruption.
Still, like the search for a federal interest, Hills's argument is not
directly based on the Constitution. The New Federalism arguments
against the prosecutions are more clearly constitutionally based, but they
do not rise to the level of constitutional commands as prohibitions.6
Things would be easy if, for example, the Constitution contained
language to the effect that "state and local governments shall not be
corrupt. Congress shall have the power to enforce this prohibition
through appropriate legislation." The document contains no such
nationalistic language, nor does it contain a federalistic prohibition on
national anti-corruption legislation. Instead, examination of the text
yields uncertainty as to the constitutional status of federal anticorruption prosecutions. That is why background understandings and
policy arguments loom large in the examination of those prosecutions.
Yet, the text is not entirely silent. Indeed, it is the ultimate source of the
background understandings and policy arguments that are invoked to
determine the ultimate validity of the widespread federal policing of
67
state and local governments.

62.
63.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985).
See Hills, supra note 56, at 114-16.

64.

Id. at 128-29.

65. See, e.g., William G. Buss, Jr., The Massachusetts Conflicts-Of-Interest Statute. An
Analysis, 45 B.U. L. REV. 299, 303 (1965) (noting use by Massachusetts of federal law as
the "model" for state legislation).
66. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 47, at 434-35.
67. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and
Local Corruption, 92 Ky. L.J. 75, 86-89 (2003); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
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II. CORRUPTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Constitution as a Direct Prohibition

A major recent contribution to the question of the Constitution's
bearing on the federal prosecutions is an article by Professor Peter
Henning. 68 His thesis is two-fold. Henning's first contention is that
"[t]he Constitution reflects the deep concern of the Founders with
preventing corruption-what I term the Constitution's 'Anti-Corruption
Legacy'-a concern that supports congressional power to reach
misconduct by officials at all levels of government for the misuse of
public authority., 69 Henning does not see a threat to the federalism
values discussed above. Quite the contrary:
Federal prosecution of corruption does not invade the
sovereignty of the states because corruption undermines the
balance established by federalism, and the national government
must protect the integrity of both sides of the federalism
equation. The constitutional design to eliminate corruption
demonstrates the Framers' intent to guard against the threat to
liberty from the misuse of public authority.
His second contention is that the "legacy" serves as a background
understanding that should guide the construction of federal statutes
potentially aimed at state and local corruption. 7' "In analyzing Congress'
constitutional power to enact a statute, the Anti-Corruption Legacy
supports a broad interpretation of congressional authority to reach the
conduct of state and local officials, regardless of whether the crime could
also be prosecuted by the state. 7 2 Henning cites and analyzes several
provisions of the Constitution to demonstrate its anti-corruption
commitment at the national level.73 The following examples are invoked
to improve his point: "Bribery" as one of the grounds for impeachment;
the prohibition of both change in the President's compensation during
his term of office and of his receipt of "'any other Emolument from the
United States, or any of them"'; the prohibition on federal officeholders'
receipt of emoluments from foreign sources; the prohibition on members
of Congress being appointed "to any federal office 'which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time' that the member was in office[; and,] [t]he
Appropriations Clause requir[ing] congressional authorization before
68. Henning, supra note 67.
69. Id. at 81.
70. Id. at 81-82.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 82.
73. See id. at 83-84, 86-89.
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[the executive] can disburse funds. 7 4 He views these standards as
"structural protections designed to limit the possibility of corruption in
75
the Federal Government.,
As for corruption at the state level, Henning identifies additional
provisions "to deal with the possibility of corruption or the misuse of
authority in the states. 7 16 He cites both the Seventh Amendment's
guarantee of jury trial and the provision for diversity jurisdiction in
Article 111.77 He sees both as designed to limit the possibility of bias in
state judicial proceedings and thus to provide a certain level of protection
against corrupt state and local governments.78
Surprisingly, the Guarantee Clause plays a small role in Henning's
overall analysis, being relegated to a footnote, albeit a long one.79 He
sees the following role for the Clause: "By permitting a federal role in
ensuring the integrity of state governments, the Guarantee Clause
reflects the Founders' concern with misuse of authority by the states."' °
However:
[T]he national government has a very restricted authority to
interfere in the administration of the state governments,
triggered only by systemic misuse of state authority that
undermines the legitimacy of the exercise of official power. The
federal concern is that abuse of authority should not reach a
level that would result in the destruction of the state
government by a tyrannical leader."'
The existence of such an "anti-corruption legacy" would play an
important, perhaps dispositive, role in analyzing many of the questions
raised by federal prosecutions of state and local officials. Indeed,
Henning demonstrates this in his use of the "legacy" as a background
understanding in a thorough and persuasive treatment of questions
82
interpreting the statutes under which corruption is prosecuted.
However, the premise of any such legacy, particularly one that rises to
the level of a guide to constitutional interpretation, seems questionable
on several counts. As an initial matter, if the Framers felt that strongly
about state and local corruption, one might ask why they did not place in
74.

6, art. 1, § 6, ci.
Id. at 86-87 (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 87.
Id. at 89.
See id.
See id. at 91.

79.

Id. n.66.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.

2).
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the document more specific prohibitions on corruption as well as
national authority to deal with it. Henning's argument seems further
weakened by the relatively small role that the Guarantee Clause plays in
it. Far more than, say, the provision for Diversity Jurisdiction, the
Guarantee Clause can be interpreted as touching upon the overall
quality of government within the states, through a broad construction of
the concept of a "Republican Form of Government." The examples
Henning does invoke are hardly dispositive. For example, the provision
in Article III for Diversity Jurisdiction may well be a potential protection
against one form of corruption, but it is present in a section that seems to
leave the very decision to create lower federal courts as well as the extent
of their jurisdiction to Congress.83
Finally, there are nagging doubts about why federal prosecution of
state and local officials maintains the federal balance. The natural
reading of that term, to use Henning's words, is "that a balance between
different levels of government will protect the liberty of the people by
preventing one level from usurping the authority of the other. ' ' . 4 The
prosecutions can be seen as usurping state and local governments'
inherent authority to police their own ranks as their political processes
deem appropriate. Moreover, to the extent that they enhance the role of
national actors, particularly the U.S. attorney, within the sub-national
political process, federal prosecutions disturb equilibrium and alter
balance. The Maryland experience, cited at the beginning of this Article,
is hardly unique.
Henning's contention is that malfunctioning state and local
governments undermine the federalism balance "by permitting
individuals to purchase an outcome or by allowing public officials to
misuse their authority for personal benefit, resulting in considerable
social costs." 86 Because federalism requires viable governments at both
levels, in order to protect individual liberty, these social costs prevent the
system from functioning as designed.
Public authority must be
legitimate, and act legitimately, at each level. This is a strong argument,
but it may not conclusively answer the question why a special role in
maintaining that balance is granted to the Federal Government,
especially if the assertion of that role is made without substantial reliance

83. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (giving Congress the power "to constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court"). I leave aside any arguments that Congress must vest in
some court the federal jurisdiction provided for in Article III.
84. Henning, supra note 67, at 85.
85. See generally ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 147-48 (discussing the
perception that "a high profile political corruption case can serve as a stepping stone to a
political career for the prosecutor").
86. Henning, supra note 67, at 85-86.
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on the Guarantee Clause. Thus, even granting this particular use of the
concept of balance to permit an imbalance in the power of the two levels,
the analysis may well come up short.
Reliance on the Guarantee Clause is central to one of the seminal
articles in the anti-corruption field: Professor Adam Kurland's piece,
The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and

Local Officials."7 Kurland is a strong defender of the prosecutions on
nationalist grounds. In his view:
[T]he primary federal interest in combating local corruption...
is based on the principle that the public is entitled to honest
government at all levels. The faith that the citizenry places in
all levels of government is the foundation of the republic. Thus,
anything that erodes that foundation is of substantial federal
interest. The citizens of the United States are therefore entitled
to federal protection from abuses of power by those who
govern.
At the same time, Kurland is strongly critical of the prosecutorial
approach that, at the time he wrote the article, required extremely broad
use of statutes based on the postal power and the Commerce Clause. He
views these statutes as not necessarily aimed at official corruption. Thus,
complex cases may not fit.89 More importantly, the statutes used to
combat state and local corruption all contain a jurisdictional predicate
that connects the defendant's conduct to a source of federal power such
as commerce. 90 As Kurland puts it:
[Uinder the traditional analysis, the federal jurisdictional
requirements of the statutes are essential to establish federal
jurisdiction. If it cannot be established that the mails were used
or that interstate commerce was in some manner affected,
certain types of criminal activity, although significant enough to
warrant federal interests, will not satisfy the requisite
jurisdictional threshold and will not qualify for federal
prosecution. 9'
His answer is to begin by approaching the problem directly and
honestly. "[N]o one seriously contends that protecting the sanctity of
interstate commerce, or protecting the integrity of the postal service, is
the principal reason the Federal Government allocates so much time and
resources toward prosecuting official corruption cases." 92 Still, some
87.
88.

Kurland, supra note 34.
Id. at 376-77 (footnote omitted).

89.

Id. at 381.

90.
91.
92.

Id. at 381-82.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 415.
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source of congressional power is necessary; a federal interest is not
enough.
The Federal Government is potentially interested in
everything.93 Kurland finds that power in the Guarantee Clause which
to every State
provides in part that "[t]he United States shall guarantee
94
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.,
The language certainly points in the direction of some authority over
state and local government, and perhaps even to the quality of that
government. "After all," Kurland asks rhetorically, "what erodes a
republican form of government more than corrupt officials?" 95 He goes
beyond an interpretation of the Clause that is limited to a concern with
monarchy, and similar structural abuses, to a broader reading that
reaches a guarantee of honest government. He relies heavily on writings
of the Framers, finding in addition to structural concerns, a moral
dimension. The Framers cared about "public virtue" as an essential
element of republican government.96 Drawing on the writings of John
Adams, for example, Kurland finds again the view that "[o]fficials who
corruptly exercise their authority and secretly enrich themselves
97
substantially erode the foundation of republican government."
As for federalism, and the notion of a National Government limited by
a small number of enumerated powers, Kurland views the Guarantee
Clause as conceptually different from those powers: a command to the
National Government to preserve the basic republican structure and the
conditions requisite to its functioning." In this respect, Kurland's views
resemble Henning's later analysis of the National Government as the
protector of the federal system through its anti-corruption efforts. Both
contentions have the advantage of placing the federal prosecutorial role
within the logic of the federal system as a whole. Reconciling the
prosecutions with federalism is thus not a problem. Indeed, Kurland sees
the Guarantee Clause as like the Fourteenth Amendment: "[A]
constitutional provision that necessarily intrudes on state sovereignty and
alters the normal federal state balance."99
Where Henning and Kurland differ is in the latter's contention that the
Guarantee Clause acts as a grant of power. Kurland finds historical
support for this view of the Clause, primarily in its use in the
93. See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
CriminalLaw, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 73 (2003) (quoting United States v. Lipscomb, 299
F.3d 303, 373 (5th Cir. 2002) (Smith, J., dissenting)).
94.
95.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Kurland, supra note 34, at 417.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 428-29.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 459.
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Reconstruction legislation.'0° He proposes an anti-corruption statute,
based on the Clause, that provides in part that "[w]hoever knowingly
executes or attempts to execute any scheme or artifice to defraud or to
deprive the citizenry of a State or locality of its right to honest, faithful,
and loyal government of such State or locality, shall be fined . . . or

imprisoned."''0 1 Indeed, Kurland presents evidence that some members
of Congress have agreed with his view that a general anti-corruption
statute could be enacted under the Guarantee Clause.0 2 The main
advantage of his thesis is that it represents a plausible basis for dealing
directly with the problem of the prosecutions: validation under a general
statute, of those prosecutions. However, Congress has never taken such
a broad view of its power, as Kurland admits.0 3 More importantly, recent
Supreme Court invocations of the Guarantee Clause seem to view it
more as a source of state autonomy than a font of federal power.14
B. The Enumerated Powers

Suppose, however, that one rejects the thesis that the Constitution
addresses the issue of state and local corruption, either through a direct
prohibition or through provisions strong enough to create a background
understanding about this corruption. That is not the end of the matter in
terms of finding federal power to bring the prosecutions. Congress may
well be able to make the basic value judgment, as it has in so many other
areas, through exercise of the enumerated powers. In fact, three of these
powers are the bases on which most federal anti-corruption law rests.
The postal power is the source of the mail fraud statute, an important
tool in the federal prosecutor's arsenal.' 5 As a textual matter, this
outcome requires a series of leaps. One can concede, following Chief
Justice Marshall's hypotheticals in McCulloch v. Maryland,' 6 that
Congress may enact criminal statutes to protect the mails.'O One can
also concede that Congress can protect the "integrity" of the mails by
barring therefrom communications that are a part of a criminal scheme.

100. Id. at 438-39.
101 Id. at 471.
102. Id. at 452-53.
103. Id. at 439.
104. E.g., Printz v, United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (listing the Guarantee
Clause among provisions that reflect the Constitution's commitment to state sovereignty).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
106. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
107. See id. at 417.
108. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350. 365 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("In considering the scope of the mail fraud statute, it is essential to remember Congress'
purpose in enacting it. Congress sought to protect the integrity of the United States mails
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The problem with modern mail fraud-as a matter of relating the
corruption prosecutions to the constitutional text and scheme-is that
almost any mailing somewhere along the line has become enough to
justify a federal criminal trial.'09 If we limit our search to the text of the
postal power and a reasonable construction of it, this power does not
seem to be the basis of a general anti-corruption statute.
The Commerce Clause presents more complex questions. We are used
to a legal universe in which this Clause is the basis for a range of moral
judgments about practices Congress wishes to condemn."0 While United
States v. Lopez.'. reminds us that the Commerce Clause has limits,11 2 the
Clause has nonetheless played a key anti-corruption role. The Hobbs
Act" 3 is the major example. The Act requires an effect on commerce as
a jurisdictional predicate for prosecuting crimes prohibited under the
Act, including extortion under color of official right." 4 It is, indeed,
possible to imagine specific instances of corruption that have such an
effect. Part IV of this Article will explore briefly broader notions of
corruption as an economic activity in and of itself. Taking the language
of the Hobbs Act and its case-by-case emphasis, as representative of
current approaches to the Commerce Clause, the leap from commerce to
any general anti-corruption statute requires some effort.
The third source of congressional power, the one endorsed in Sabri v.
United States,"' is the spending power. Congress can "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States." 6 It is not a
leap to conclude that the general welfare includes governments free from
corruption, especially given a history of deference to Congress's
determination of what the general welfare means.1' 7 Congress could, for
example, enact a grant program to fund state and local anti-corruption
efforts. It could probably attach anti-corruption "strings" to federal
grant programs for those units of government. Sabri, however, involves a
statute that does neither. Eighteen U.S.C. § 666 is a criminal statute,
apparently designed to protect federal funds from diversion and other
by not allowing them to be used as 'instruments of crime.'" (quoting United States v.
Brewer, 528 F.2d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 1975))).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 2327-35 (discussing jurisdictional scope of mail
fraud statute).
110. E.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 362 (1903).

111.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).

112.
113.

Id. at 553.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).

114.

Id.

115.

124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004).

116.

U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 1.

117.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987).
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After Sabri, the statute has become the closest
dishonest practices.
thing our system has to a general federal anti-corruption law.1 9 The fact
that the Court took this extraordinary step, and did so almost casually,
merits close examination.

III. SEcriON 666 AND SABRI-No LIMITS?
A. Section 666
Eighteen U.S.C. § 666 provides, in part, as follows:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of
this section exists(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without
authority knowingly converts to the use of any person other
than the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies, property
that(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or
control of such organization, government, or agency; or
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any
person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from
any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in
connection with any business, transaction, or series of
transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more; or
(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value
to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an
organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or
any agency thereof, in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization,
government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or
more;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.
(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section
is that the organization, government, or agency receives, in any
one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal

118.
119.

See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000); Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1946.
See infra Part IV.
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program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee,
insurance, or other form of Federal assistance. 20
Obviously, the statute raises a host of questions. If, for example, one
removes § 666(b) and the reference to it in § 666(a), the statute looks like
a general anti-corruption statute. Not only are the classic corruption
offenses of bribery and offers of bribes covered, but also § 666(a)(1)(A)
covers
a variety
•
•
121 of other crimes, two of which might be subject to broad
interpretation.
As discussed below, the concept of fraud has been
developed, in the context of the mail fraud statute, into a broad category
of "honest services."2 2 Potentially then, § 666, either through the
concept of fraud or the uncertain crime of "misapplication," could apply
to a wide variety of corrupt acts beyond the classic bribery offenses. Of
course, § 666(b) is part of the statute as well. Thus, it contains two limits:
the $5,000 minimum for any of the covered transactions and, more
importantly, the requirement that the entity whose agent is prosecuted
receive more than $10,000 in federal assistance each year.'3 However,
given the large number of governmental and other entities that receive
this amount of federal funding each year, the question arises whether the
limits play a meaningful role in preventing the statute from being the
long-sought general anti-corruption law.
The major debate surrounding the statute has been addressed to this
very question, and has involved the issue of a possible "nexus"
requirement within the statute. That is, should courts require that the
prosecution not only prove the corrupt acts and the receipt of the funds,
but should a connection between the federal funds and the corruption be
present in the case as well? Opinions have differed as to whether any
such requirement should be read into the statute as an element to be
proved in each case, or whether it is the ultimate test of the statute's
validity if applied to situations where no such connection exists. 2 4
Closely related to the question of the statute's validity is the
conceptual dilemma of how to analyze it. Virtually everyone agrees that
§ 666 was passed pursuant to the congressional spending power.'2 It
would thus seem to follow that the classic test for examining the validity

120. 18 U.S.C. § 666.
121. Id.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 223-35.
123. 18 U.S.C. §666.
124. Oral Argument at 31-33, Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004) (No. 0344); cf. United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Mass. 1998) (striking down
the statute as applied).
125. See Sabri, 124 S.Ct. at 1946-47; Garnett, supra note 93,at 41 n.200 (citing cases to
the effect that § 666 represents an exercise of the spending power).
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of spending power statutes as laid out in South Dakota v. Dole2 6 would
be the appropriate analytical framework. Dole, however, involved
assessment127 of the validity of conditions attached to federal grant
Although often criticized as toothless, the multi-part
programs.
•128 Dole
The
test has the potential to impose real limits on grant conditions.
that
while
§
666
present
context
is
applying
Dole
in
the
problem with
may have been passed pursuant to the spending power, it is not a grant
condition. Nor is it specifically phrased as a "Cross-Cutting" condition
that applies to all grant recipients. Rather, it is a criminal statute that
applies to the "agents" of entities receiving more than $10,000 in federal
funds each year." 9 The constitutional question that then arises is whether
such a criminal statute is a more intrusive exercise of federal authority
than the grant conditions that have been measured under Dole. As
noted, efforts have been made to temper the statute by applying some
form of nexus or connection requirement derived from the "relatedness"
prong of the Dole test."O Recent scholarship, particularly the work of
Professor Richard Garnett, has emphasized the possible role of the
Necessary and Proper Clause in analyzing the validity of a criminal
statute, passed under the spending power, not directly applicable to the
recipients of the funds."'
B. Some PreliminaryQuestions
The ultimate question posed by the statute is what the federal role

should be in policing state and local corruption through creation of a
federal criminal offense. It seems clear from the legislative history that
the drafters had no such lofty ambitions in mind as creating a general

anti-corruption statute and did not view an enactment concerning
"'[t]heft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds"' as
presenting these fundamental issues. 32 Congress was faced with what it
viewed as the inadequacy of existing methods of protecting federal funds
in the hands of local officials and their sub-grantees. However narrow
the problem Congress was addressing, it passed a broad statute with the
potential to evolve into an across-the-board anti-corruption statute
carrying with it an alteration of the federal state balance. 133 For an initial
126.

483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).

127. Id. at 206-07.
128.
COLUM.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See generally Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95
L. REV. 1911 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2000); see also Brown, supra note 20, at 297.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 n.3, 215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See Garnett, supra note 93, at 77.
See Brown, supra note 20, at 276.
Id. at 253.
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period, the statute developed "below the radar." However, a number of
court of appeals decisions and a growing body of academic literature
brought the "stealth statute" to light in the late 1990s.134 Indeed, prior to
Sabri, the Supreme Court had already issued two significant opinions
concerning § 666.3'
C. Section 666 in the Supreme Court Before Sabri
The Court first dealt with the statute in the 1997 case of Salinas v.
United States. 36 The unanimous decision upheld a broad construction of
the statute against the contention that it might require that "the
Government ... prove the bribe in some way affected federal funds, for
instance[,] by diverting or misappropriating them, before the bribe
violates [it].' 37 The Court rejected any "interpretation that federal funds
must be affected."' 38 It relied primarily on the broad language of the
statute. The opinion does not stand for the proposition that § 666 raises
no constitutional issues. The Court emphasized that there was "no
serious doubt about the constitutionality" of the statute "as applied to
the facts of this case."'' 39 Indeed, the Court concluded that "the statute is
constitutional as applied in this case. ' 1' ° The opinion did not reject a
nexus requirement, holding only that the Government did not have to
prove federal funds were "involved" in the bribery at issue. 4' Thus,
while hospitable to the statute, Salinas contains tantalizing suggestions
that serious constitutional questions do, indeed, lurk beneath the
surface. 42
The Court continued its hospitable construction of § 666 in Fischer v.
United States. 143 At issue was whether hospitals participating in the
Medicare program received "benefits" under § 666(b), thus triggering its

134.

See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998); Paul

Salvatoriello, The Practical Necessity of Federal Intervention Versus the Ideal of
Federalism: An Expansive View of Section 666 in the Prosecution of State and Local

Corruption,89 GEO L. 2393 (2001).
135. Id. at 2395, 2407.
136. 522 U.S. 52 (1997).

137.

Id. at 55 (emphasis added).

138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

56-57.
60.
61.
60.

142. See Brown, supra note 6, at 506-09. Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., reads Salinas
broadly as apparently resolving any constitutional issues. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern
Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427,

459 (1998).
143. 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
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criminal provisions.' 44 The Court concluded that participation in the
program resulted in receipt of benefits, turning to Salinas for support of a
construction of § 666 that could be described as "'expansive,' 'both as to
the [conduct] forbidden and the entities covered."'1 45 Again, the Court
showed awareness of and concern for the potential federalism issues
raised by the breadth of the statute and the need to limit it. The majority
stated that it did not wish to "turn almost every act of fraud or bribery
into a federal offense, upsetting the proper federal balance."1' 6 Indeed,
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, relying in part on federalism
considerations such as those enunciated in Lopez. 47 For the dissenters,
"[w]ithout a jurisdictional provision that would ensure that in each case
the exercise of federal power is related to the federal interest in a federal
program, § 666 would criminalize routine acts of fraud or bribery, which,
as the Court admits, would 'upse[t] the proper federal balance."' 48 Their
dissent, as well as the cautionary notes sounded by the entire Court in
Salinas, appeared to indicate a continuing awareness of the federalism
issues and constitutional questions referred to above. However, in Sabri,
caution disappeared.
D. Sabri
Sabri involved the indictment of a Minneapolis developer for the
following corrupt acts: offering a $5,000 kickback to a city councilor for
obtaining regulatory approvals; offering a $10,000 bribe to the councilor
to set up a meeting with objecting abutters; and, a ten percent
commission on community economic development grants that the
defendant sought from the city and its funding entity for housing and
economic development. 149 The proposed prosecution easily met the
requisites of § 666. In the year of the acts at issue, the Minneapolis City
150
Council had administered twenty-nine million dollars in federal funds.
Moreover, the housing and economic development entity from which the
defendant sought aid was, itself, a substantial recipient of federal funds.'
Defendant Sabri challenged the "indictment on the ground that
§ 666(a)(2) is unconstitutional on its face for failure to require proof of a
connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe, as an

144. Id. at 669.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Salinas,522 U.S. at 56).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 689 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

148. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
149.
150.

Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1944 (2004).
Id. at 1945.

151.

Id.
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element of liability., 152 The district court agreed with this contention and
dismissed the indictment on grounds of facial invalidity. 5 3 A divided
Eighth Circuit reinstated the indictment, both upholding the statute and
construing it as
51 4 not requiring proof of a connection between a bribe and
federal funds.
This decision accentuated a split among the circuits, reflecting the
constitutional issues referred to above, as to whether a connection with
federal funds was in fact necessary to permit federal prosecution of the
conduct under the spending power. The Supreme Court stated that its
reason for granting certiorari was to resolve this circuit conflict.' 55 The
Court had no problem in resolving the issue in favor of a broad
construction of the statute dispensing altogether with any nexus
requirement, and "readily dispose[d]" of the contention that this broad
construction posed any constitutional problem.'- Indeed, although there
were two separate concurring opinions,157 no justice seemed to see any
problem with the constitutionality of § 666 as a general anti-corruption
statute.
The Court's opinion is a model of simplicity. First of all, Congress had
unquestioned authority to appropriate federal grant funds to further the
general welfare. Although the Court did not refer to the facts at hand on
this point, the housing and other grants received by Minneapolis are
typical examples of the spending power in action. Second, Congress has
"corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to see
to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under [the spending] power are in
fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away.' 5 8 Congress
could well be concerned that dishonest public officers who are
"untrustworthy stewards" or who "do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value"
will not distinguish according to the source of funds when committing
their corrupt acts." 9 Furthermore, the fungibility of federal funds is an
additional reason for not requiring proof of their presence in any
particular corrupt activity. The Court invoked Justice Marshall's
venerable hypothetical in McCulloch to the effect that the "power to

152. id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 1945-46.
157. Id. at 1949 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); id. at 1949-51 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
15& Id. at 1946 (citation omitted).
159. Id.
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establish post-offices and post-roads entails authority to punish those
who steal letters."' 6
The Court's short and simple analysis almost masks the fact that it
adopted one of the major contending arguments in the ongoing debate
over the constitutionality of § 666: the integrity rationale. The rationale
proceeds on the assumption that measures directed solely at transactions
involving federal funds will often be insufficient to protect those funds.
What is needed is a broad net that achieves protection through sweeping
up all corrupt transactions in order to guarantee the integrity of the
recipient entity. However, this rationale can readily extend to treating
the concern for state and local integrity as the major federal interest, with
the protection of federal funds operating almost as a pretext. Federalism
concerns were barely mentioned in Sabri. The Court relegated any
problems stemming from "federal prosecution in an area historically of
161
It found Lopez and United States v.
state concern" to a footnote .
62
Morrison totally inapplicable because those Commerce Clause cases
involved activity that had little relation to economic conduct that
Congress could regulate. 163 Here, there was no need to "'pile inference
upon inference"' since the spending power was directly involved.' 6 In
sum, whatever constitutional reservations the debate over § 666 had
previously engendered and had come to light in Salinas were summarily
rejected. After Sabri, § 666 seems free to roam the political landscape as
long as the sub-national entity where it comes into play receives more
than $10,000 in federal funds "'in any one year,'' ' 65 and the corrupt
transaction involves more than166 $5,000 or, in the Court's words, "goes
well beyond liquor and cigars.'
Having given total victory to the broad reading of § 666, the Court
seemed almost to take it away in a curious "afterword" dealing with
Sabri's ability to bring a facial challenge to the statute. 67 The Court
expressed substantial doubt about the wisdom of such challenges and
noted that "the acts charged against Sabri himself were well within the
If he was making an
limits of legitimate congressional concern."' '
overbreadth challenge to the effect that the statute could not be enforced

160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting McCulloch
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,417 (1819)).
161. Id. at 1948 n.*.
162. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
163. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1947.
164. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1945 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(b)).
Id. at 1946.
Id. at 1948.
Id.

v.
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against someone else, the Court seemed to say that such challenges are
limited to a "relatively few settings."' 69 This "afterword" raises the
interesting question of whether the Court decided anything at all with
respect to the narrow (nexus) reading of § 666 or the broad one. As the70
nexus reading.'
Government's brief noted, neither party advocated the
The Government, after all, wanted the broad reading. Sabri, on the
other hand, would lose even under the narrow reading because federal
funds appeared to be clearly involved in his schemes. Thus, the Court
purported to resolve the predicate issue of statutory construction without
either party arguing one of the contending sides.
It may be objected that Sabri, at least, did argue for a nexus
requirement as essential to the statute's validity as part of his facial
challenge. In the "afterword" the Court cast doubt on whether he could
bring that challenge at all. Indeed, since there was already a Supreme
Court decision upholding the statute as applied (Salinas), it is particularly
hard to see how there was any serious argument for a facial challenge.
The Government, in fact, opposed the grant of certiorari on the grounds
that there was no justiciable issue.17' Perhaps the Court had to decide the
construction issue to reach the validity question, but the Court's own
words raise issues as to whether the validity question was properly before
it. Perhaps this apparent dicta belongs in the arcane world of
overbreadth and other issues relating to facial challenges, and Sabri
should be read as standing for what it says. However, the "afterword"
suggests that the Court might well have dismissed the petition as
improvidently granted, or otherwise ducked the broad issues concerning
The conclusion is inescapable that
§ 666's construction and validity.'
the Court reached out to take a strong anti-corruption stand in order to
emphasize its condemnation of corrupt activities at all levels of
government.
The central constitutional aspect of Sabri is its acceptance of the
integrity rationale, that is, that the Federal Government can act "to
safeguard the integrity" of grant recipients in order to protect the
Obviously, integrity might have several meanings.
disbursed funds.'
The term might be limited to the federal funds themselves or to the
broader manner in which a particular federally funded program is
administered. For example, in Salinas, correction officials took bribes to
169. Id.
170. Brief for the United States at 17 n.3, Sabri (No. 03-44).
171. Brief for the United States in Opposition at *6, *10-12, Sabri (No. 03-44).
172. Had the Court done so, these issues would have remained in their partially
unresolved state following Salinas and Fischer.
173. See Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1943, 1946. A key early case in the development of the
integrity rationale is United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988).
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permit conjugal visits to federal prisoners housed in a state jail. 7
Integrity might mean the fiscal honesty of a recipient unit as a whole.
Again, one can see a tie, albeit less direct, to the federal funds. However,
integrity will certainly bear a much broader reading: the general quality
of a recipient unit, in the case of a governmental one, whether or not it
practices "good government." One could surely find a lack of integrity in
a governmental unit in which nepotism and patronage are rampant, "noshow" jobs exist, opposition parties are squelched by entrenched
officeholders and there is a general sense of helplessness on the part of
excluded groups. Would the Sabri rationale permit the Federal
Government to regulate these practices directly, for example, by
penalizing the awarding of patronage jobs? Ultimately there could be a
relation back to some federal funds (in the sense that administrative
positions with control over those funds might not be awarded on merit),
but the goal of federal intervention seems to be the use of the spending
power to achieve broader federal public policy ends of good government.
In this respect, the case most on point is Oklahoma v. United States
Civil Service Commission.'7' A variant on the Hatch Act was designed to
prohibit partisan activity by state or local employees "whose principal
employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole
or part by loans or grants made by the United States or by any Federal
agency.' 7' An elaborate procedure provided for hearings by the U.S.
Civil Service Commission to determine if the forbidden partisan conduct
had occurred. In the event of a positive finding, the Commission was to
"certify" to the granting agency an "order requiring it to withhold" from
the relevant grants a sum tied to the officials' compensation.'
The
Supreme Court upheld the statute on traditional spending power
grounds: Oklahoma had the choice of not taking the funds in the first
place, and had accepted the conditions that accompanied the grant.
However, the Court noted the end sought by the provision at issue:
"[B]etter public service by requiring those who administer funds for
19
national needs to abstain from active political partisanship., 7
Oklahoma thus represents a clear endorsement of the use of the grant
device to further national values of good public administration. Section
174. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 55 (1997).
175. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
Commentators have recognized the importance of
Oklahoma as a key precedent in establishing the Federal Government's interest in
combating state and local corruption. See Brown, supra note 20, at 272; Henning, supra
note 67, at 100-01.
176. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 129 n.1. For the current language of the statute, see
Henning, supra note 67, at 101 n.102.
177. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 129 n.1.
17& Id. at 137-38.

179. Id. at 143.
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666 seems to go even farther in this direction through the integrity
pretext. This rationale allows Congress to reach deeply into the
operations of any recipient government and has the potential to come
close to federalizing any recipient of federal funds. The Court failed to
sound the cautionary note that federalism values would seem to require
and that it had, indeed, sounded in Salinas.
The important question of constitutional method previously referred
to then arises: what is the proper framework for analyzing the validity of
§ 666? It is tempting to use the analysis the Court set forth in Dole for
exercises of the spending power. That analysis remains the vehicle for
challenges to federal grant conditions.' 8° However, § 666 is not a
condition; rather, it is a direct command enforceable through criminal
law. In that respect, it differs from the typical grant case, even from
Oklahoma in which the key enforcement proceeding concerning a
particular official's conduct took place at the federal level. Indeed, it
might be contended that direct criminal laws such as § 666 are more
intrusive on federalism values and that accusations that the Dole test is
too lax make it even less appropriate in this context. Nonetheless, Dole
remains the Court's principal exposition of an approach to the spending
power, and it may be helpful even if used by analogy. If the crucial
question is how to cabin § 666 through some sort of nexus or connection,
the Dole requirement that a condition be related to the purpose of a
particular grant seems relevant and helpful. 8' Building on it, one can
argue that at some point the integrity rationale takes the Federal
Government too far away from the act of spending and too far into the
internal operations of recipient entities.
Despite this attraction, however, Professor Garnett has argued that
"Dole's usefulness as a translator for these federal-nexus claims is
overstated, and Dole-based challenges to § 666 and its applications are
misplaced. Properly understood, the issue is not whether the statute or
its uses satisfy that case's ... criteria but whether those criteria apply at
all., 182 The point is that the element of choice in the acceptance of any
particular grant is missing. Thus, principles based on that element are
not helpful in evaluating a statute which is not linked to any contractual
notion of choice. It is at this point that analysis based on the Necessary
and Proper Clause comes to play an important role. The task for
necessary and proper analysis is to find in it limits that will prevent a
statute as broad as § 666 from becoming a "sweeping" prohibition of
state and local corruption. Garnett sees the danger of a combination of
180.

See Garnett, supra note 93, at 61 (discussing Dole test and its possible relevance

in the context of § 666).
181. See Brown, supra note 20, at 262-72.
182. Garnett, supra note 93, at 62.
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the spending power and the Necessary and Proper Clause that leads to a
point where Congress can regulate or outlaw anything."3 The search for
limits leads to what he and others have called the "non-infinity"
principle.'8 Limits might be introduced by harking back to the need for
"fit" between a particular law and the enumerated powers of Congress
and the limitations on them such as the Bill of Rights.'5 However, the
relatively short shrift that the Court gave to necessary and proper
arguments in Sabri suggests that they do not yet add a great deal to the
attempt to limit § 666.186 Of course, it must be noted that federalism
arguments got equally short shrift, perhaps, as I have suggested, because
of the Court's desire to make a strong anti-corruption statement.
In the end, that is the lesson and the question that we must take from
Sabri: to what extent does a perceived national anti-corruption
imperative, whatever its source, overcome considerations of federalism?
The Maryland example shows that perceived extreme cases of
intervention can be curbed, but the general phenomenon persists.
Certainly the widespread prosecution of state and local officials for the
manner in which they govern raises serious questions. Holding those
officials accountable for their style of governance ought to be as much a
matter of constitutional concern as the policies they adopt, a subject
deemed to merit that concern in both New York v. United States 87 and
Printz v. United States.1 8s As suggested, the use of direct federal criminal
law seems even more of an intrusion than the typical grant enforcement
mechanism, even one as federalized as that in Oklahoma. After all, it
will usually be the federal grantor agency that takes the lead in
determining non-compliance with any particular condition. A criminal
statute like § 666 breaks the grantor agency-grantee agency relationship,
and introduces the U.S. attorney, an actor whose priorities may have
nothing to do with the grant program. Moreover, by the very fact of
enacting an additional federal criminal statute, Congress can be seen to
invade the province of the states in yet another way.18 9
At this point, it is instructive to compare Sabri with McConnell.
McConnell upheld restrictions on campaign finance practices and related

183. Id. at 82.
184. Id. at 83.
185. See id. at 79, 81.
186. The Court limited the role of review to one of "means-ends rationality under the
Necessary and Proper Clause." Sabri v. United, 124 S. Ct. 1941,1946 (2004).
187. 505 U.S. 194 (1992).
188. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
189. The invasion occurs in the form of enlarging the domain of federal criminal law.
The federal criminal law debate can be seen as separate and distinct from the more
specific question of federal prosecutions of state and local officials for political corruption.
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activities, restrictions that could be enforced through the criminal law."o
The restrictions were imposed by Congress in the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).'9 ' BCRA increased the level of regulation
of federal campaigns in two primary ways. It sharply curtailed the role of
soft money-contributions to political parties for purposes other than the
BCRA also imposed
direct influencing of a national election. 92
substantial limits on "issue ads," defined by the Court as ads "specifically
intended to affect election results,"' 93 but omitting "'magic words' such as
'Elect John Smith,' or 'Vote against Jane Doe."" 94 Opponents mounted
a substantial First Amendment challenge to BCRA, but a majority of the
Court built upon the line of cases beginning with Buckley v. Valeo,'9 ' and
amplified in later precedent such as Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC,'96 to formulate a set of anti-corruption governmental
interests that met the Government's burden to justify incursions on the
First Amendment.' 97 The government interest goes beyond preventing
quid pro quo corruption'" to countering "the appearance or perception
from politicians too
of corruption,"'9 and even "'to the broader threat
''
compliant with the wishes of large contributors. ,200
One can, of course, identify differences between the two cases. In
McConnell, the statute regulated the electoral process. 0 In Sabri, the
statute regulated the functioning of government. 2°2 McConnell involved
the regulation of activities primarily at the federal level. Sabriinvolved
the regulation of activities at the local level.20 ' In McConnell, the
regulated activities were essentially political advocacy and political
206
205
In
In Sabri, the regulated activity was bribery.
contributions.
190. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 762 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles I and II).

191.

Pub. L. No. 107-55, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,

18, 36, and 47 U.S.C.A.).
192. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 648-50 (discussing soft money).

193. Id. at 651.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 650.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. 655-66 (discussing First Amendment analysis in the context

of soft money).
198. Id. at 660.
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 389).
201. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656-57.
202. Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1946 (2004).
203. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 657.
204.
205.

Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1947.
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 657-58.

206. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1944-45.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 54:403

McConnell, the principal constitutional defense against the challenged
statute was the First Amendment.0 7 In Sabri, the challenge was based on
federalism. 208 Finally, McConnell relied substantially on notions of public
Sabri focused
confidence and the appearance of impropriety.0
210
substantially on the integrity of governmental operations.
Despite these differences, I see the two cases united by a broad anticorruption imperative that justifies Congress's role as the guardian of the
democratic process at all stages and at all levels. Each case focused on
the importance of integrity in government. The integrity of recipient
governments is the key to Sabri's protection of federal funds rationale.
McConnell invoked prior precedents as demonstrating a congressional
intent in protecting "'the integrity of our system of representative
democracy.' 21' As in Sabri, the notion of "integrity" is central to the
analysis.212 Indeed, parts of McConnell point in a "good government"
direction.1 3 Beyond a similar approach to recognizing Congress's role in
achieving good government, each case demonstrates considerable
deference to Congress in determining how to achieve that goal, even in
the face of serious constitutional objection.
E. Section 666 After Sabri

Sabri certainly looks like a sweeping victory for proponents of national
anti-corruption efforts. Before further examination of how best to
vindicate that position, it may be useful to consider whether the decision
completely forecloses any consideration of the constitutionality of § 666
in a case where there is little if any perceptible nexus between federal
funds and the corrupt act charged. At first blush, the answer would seem
to be yes, given the Court's adoption of the no-nexus construction of the
statute and its equally strong adoption of the integrity rationale for that
214
remains
the somewhat
conclusion.
that the
suggesting troubling
in Salinas
language
well as thethere
"afterword," as However,

207. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 655.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1947-48.
McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656.
Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1947.
McConnell, 124 S.Ct. at 647 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976)

(per curiam)).
212. The term "integrity" appears at several points in the McConnell opinion. E.g., id.;
id. at 656; id. at 658 n.42.
213. See id. at 664 ("[P]laintiffs conceive of corruption too narrowly."); id. at 666
("Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the
danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their
constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial
contributions valued by the officeholder.").

214.

Id. at 1946-47.
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question was an open one .2 " Recall that the Sabri Court stated that, at
best, the petitioner could assert that the statute would be
unconstitutional as applied to someone else, but refused to let him make
that person's hypothetical challenge.2 6 What happens now if such a
person comes before the Court armed with a challenge that Sabri, who
was clearly attempting to tamper with federal funds, could not make?
Perhaps the opinion means exactly what it seems to say, foreclosing
further consideration of the matter. The best guess is that the Court will,
in fact, treat the matter as closed; any other reading would require
treating the first part of the decision as dicta, with the holding coming
only in the afterword. Perhaps traditional values such as those associated
with Article III and highly case-specific adjudication would have been
better served if the "afterword" was the only decision. Certainly,
federalism would have been better served if the issue of potentially
narrowing § 666 could have been fought out in a case where the parties
could focus both on construction of the statute and on the possibility of a
nexus requirement as the ultimate standard in as-applied challenges. In
Sabri no one disagreed about the construction of the statute.
Let us take the Court at its word, however. We now have something
very close to a general anti-corruption statute in the form of § 666. How
far it extends will then depend, not on any judicial oversight, but on the
restraint and/or creativity of federal prosecutors. There will be some
direct supervision from Washington, whether through specific
interventions as in Maryland, or through the general guidance of the
United States Attorneys' Manual. But individual discretion will be
extensive. In the remainder of this Article, I wish to focus on the
nationalist, anti-corruption values that Sabri unquestionably. advances.
The goal is to raise the question whether a more satisfactory
constitutional basis for the approach is possible and desirable.
IV. BEYOND SABRI- ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR FEDERAL ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS

Taking our cue from Sabri, let us assume that the constitutional
climate is favorable to the nationalist view of federal anti-corruption
efforts, and that federalism questions have been resolved in favor of
those efforts. It does not follow that Sabri is the last word. The question
remains both whether § 666 should now emerge as the major broadbased anti-corruption statute, and whether there are alternative
constitutional justifications for the federal role other than protecting
federal funds disbursed under the spending power. In this Section, I wish
215.
216.

Id. at 1948-49; Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1997).
Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948.
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to offer briefly some observations on the latter point. It is worth
beginning, however, with the form of an ideal statute. Both Professor
Kurland's proposal and earlier legislation supported by the Department
of Justice relied primarily on the concept of deprivation and defrauding
of "the honest services" of public officials." 7 "Honest services" is a
concept that has developed in the interpretation of the mail fraud statute,
as discussed below. It is exceedingly broad in scope, encompassing
transactional forms of corruption such as bribery, and, probably, failure
to disclose breaches of fiduciary duties, as well as establishing a broad
range of fiduciary duties.218 It is far from clear that § 666 can be
expanded to encompass the range of corruption reached by the honest
services concept. The statute does include obtaining "by fraud" property
worth more than $5,000 as one of the criminal acts it reaches.2 9
However, it is uncertain whether that use of fraud is as broad as the
honest services concept of fraud that Congress, following the lead of
lower courts, has explicitly written into the mail fraud statute. Let us
focus on the constitutional bases and rationales for a national anticorruption statute, recognizing that the "protection of federal funds"
argument relied on in Sabri has limits and also suffers from being
somewhat pretextual. If Congress is now free to adopt a general statute,
why not rely on constitutionally based authority to do so?
A. Mail Fraud
An initial argument that must be dealt with is that Congress has
already done so through the enactment of the mail fraud statute and its
specific amendment in 1988."0 Prior to that amendment, the statute (as
well as the wire fraud statute) made it a crime for persons with a scheme
to defraud or to "obtain[] money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses" to place, "for the purpose of executing such
2 21
scheme," in the mails anything that the Postal Service would deliver.
The natural reading of the statute is that one should not utilize the Postal
Service for the purpose of carrying out fraud, such as a false solicitation
for worthless land. The lower courts had, however, construed the
concept of "defraud" broadly to include deprivations of the citizens' right
217. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 270-71 (citing proposed Violent Crime
Prevention Act of 1991, supported by the Department of Justice).
218. For a general discussion of the honest services doctrine, see Henning, supra note
67, at 135-47.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000); cf Henning, supra note 67, at 128 ("The
federal interest in preventing and punishing corruption supports the broad reading of §
666 in Salinas and Fischer as a powerful anti-corruption statute that reaches misconduct
beyond what other federal criminal statutes had covered.").
220. Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VII, subtitle o, sec. 7603(a), § 1364, 102 stat. 4508 (1988).
221. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000); id. § 1343.
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22

of honest services.
In 1988, in response to a Supreme Court decision
calling a halt to this development, Congress passed a statute providing in
part that "the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme 'or
23
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.
Not surprisingly, an extraordinary range of corrupt practices, including
but not limited to, various forms of bribery and failure to disclose
breaches of fiduciary duty have been construed to fit within the concept
of honest services. For example, in United States v. Lopez-Lukis,224 the
Eleventh Circuit held that a deprivation of honest services occurred
when a local legislator sold not only her vote but also her influence in
delivering a majority of the board on which she served. 22' The court
cautioned against any reading of the statute that would "impermissibly
narrow the scope [of the honest services amendment] and 'would belie
22 a
clear congressional intent to construe the mail fraud statute broadly.'
There is,then, little doubt as to the scope of conduct embraced by the
mail fraud statute, but there is considerable doubt as to whether it can, or
should, serve as a general anti-corruption statute. After all, both the
statute and the Constitution require some connection to the mails. In the
seminal case of Shmuck v. United States,227 the Supreme Court appeared
to take a loose approach to any requirement that the mails be a direct
part of the scheme.
The case involved selling cars with altered
odometers. The mailing that triggered the statute was from the dealers
who purchased cars from the defendant to the State Department of
Transportation. 2 The department required the dealers' customers to
provide a title-application form. 230 Despite precedent pointing in the
other direction, the Court found these mailings, though not made by the
defendant, to be "an essential step in the successful passage of title to the
retail purchasers., 231
Shmuck was a highly contested five-to-four
decision, in which the four dissenters cautioned that
the law does not establish a general federal remedy against
fraudulent conduct, with use of the mails as the jurisdictional
222. For a discussion of the development of the "honest services" theory in the lower
courts, see Henning, supra note 67, at 136-41.
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000). For a discussion of this statute as a response to McNally
v.United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), see, for example, ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at
134-35.
224. 102 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 1997).
225. Id. at 1169.
226. Id. at 1171 (quoting United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1456 (11th Cir. 1996)).
227. 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
228. Id. at 707.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 714.
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hook, but reaches only "those limited instances in which the use
of the mails, is a part of the execution of the fraud, leaving all

other cases to be dealt with by appropriate state law." 232
Beyond statutory problems, it is hard to see any relationship between the
mailings in Schmuck and the integrity of the mails or the protection of
the system. This is a constitutional problem. It is the existence of such a
relationship that ties the statute to the postal power. 23' There may be a
trend in the lower courts to distinguish Shmuck, almost to the point of
distinguishing it away, focusing on the earlier Supreme Court cases that
emphasized the relationship of the mailing to the fraudulent scheme.
Courts of appeals have applied this more stringent test both in ordinary
fraud cases and in public corruption, honest services cases.

4

T

We thus

return to the concerns voiced by Professor Kurland that the requirement
of meeting jurisdictional elements can, indeed, be a significant barrier to
the mail fraud statute acting as a general anti-corruption law. 3 Perhaps
there really does have to be a mailing somewhere in the case that is
connected to the fraud.
B. Corruptionas Commerce

Over the years, Congress has used the Commerce Clause to regulate a
wide variety of subjects. 236 It may be that the Clause justifies a broad
anti-corruption statute as fitting comfortably within existing Supreme
Court precedents, even those establishing limits such as Lopez and
Morrison. Indeed, Justice Thomas concurred in Sabri on the ground that
27
upholding § 666 was justified by existing Commerce Clause precedent. 3
One way of reaching this approach would be to take an extremely broad
view of commerce, drawing on the work of academics such as Professor
Rose-Ackerman. In this view, the public and private sectors are part of a
232.

Id. at 722-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88,

95 (1944)).
233. See Henning, supra note 67, at 143-45. Professor Henning is a strong defender of
the broad use of the mail fraud statute. He states that the congressional validation of the
"honest services" theory is justified by the presence of "strong federal interests" which
justify possible overlap with state criminal jurisdiction, and that the statute "is a clear
congressional mandate that federal authority can be used to police misconduct by state
and local officials." Id. As previously discussed, Henning invokes the "anti-corruption
legacy" of the Constitution to support congressional authority in this area. Id. at 146-47.
234. See United States v. Strong, 371 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cross,
128 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 1997).
235. See Kurland, supra note 34, at 381.
236. E.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321,363-64 (1903).
237. See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1949-51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)). See supra text
accompanying notes 240-42, for a discussion of Perez. Justice Thomas did, however,
express reservations about that line of precedent. See infra note 243.
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larger economy, in which different methods are used for the distribution
of goods and services. Just as Congress can regulate the private market,
a proposition with solid roots in cases such as Wickard v. Filburn,238 so
can it regulate the public sector market in goods and services as part of
its overall power.
Such a broad concept of the realm of
commerce/economic power has considerable theoretical appeal, but may
go beyond what either Congress or the Court is willing to consider as the
part of the economy that Congress can regulate. It would seem to permit
regulation of municipal fees and taxes, for example.
Let us consider a somewhat more narrow, but still encompassing
approach. That is, the notion that consensual corrupt transactions are a
form of payment for government services that Congress can potentially
regulate, just as it can potentially regulate other forms of consensual
economic transactions. As Professor Henning puts it, in the context of
the Hobbs Act, "Extortion under color of official right ... involves a
quid pro quo exchange of something of value for the exercise-or nonexercise-of governmental power.
The corrupt transaction is
fundamentally an economic one in which the official seeks to benefit
personally from the misuse of authority." 239 It is instructive that, in Sabri,
2410
Justice Thomas cited Perez v. United States, in which the Court upheld
regulation of loan-sharking on the grounds that it was an extortionate
credit transaction.2 4 ' An advantage of a Commerce Clause-based anticorruption statute is that it would seem to dispense with any problems of
requiring a showing of an effect on commerce in the particular case, or
any other form of jurisdictional requirement, such as the receipt of more
than $10,000 in federal assistance in § 666. Perez is relevant here as well.
It is possible to aggregate similar commercial transactions to reach the
level of a substantial effect on interstate commerce regardless of the
magnitude of any particular one.2 42
Nonetheless, there may be problems with the Commerce Clause
approach to a general anti-corruption statute. Non-transactional forms
238. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
239. Henning, supra note 67, at 134 (footnote omitted). Henning argues that Congress
could have enacted § 666 under its commerce power. Id. at 123. He perhaps takes a
broader view of corruption as commerce than the quid pro quo language cited above
would suggest. "Corruption is largely an economic offense; it is not a crime of violence or
one with only an attenuated commercial effect. Misuse of governmental authority
enriches both officeholders and those offering bribes because it is likely to result in a
misallocation of governmental resources." td.
240. 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1949 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part).
241. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154.
242. The classic aggregation case remains Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942). For a discussion of aggregation versus jurisdictional elements, see Brown, supra
note 43, at 1009-17.
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of corruption may not be easily reached. The Perez analogy may also be
flawed in the sense that the case seemed to rest on the proposition that
Congress could reach the legal market in credit transactions. Therefore,
it could reach the illegal market in extortionate credit transactions. As
discussed above, there is doubt whether Congress could regulate, for
example, fees charged by municipalities for building permits. There are
also lingering doubts about possible limits flowing from Lopez and its
heightened concern for federalism when the Commerce Clause is used
for regulation of matters far outside the classic view of the economy that
Justice Thomas advanced, albeit alone, in that case.14 ' Finally, it is worth
noting that Congress has never adopted an all-encompassing view of
commerce as justifying anti-corruption legislation. Rather, it has relied
on jurisdictional elements requiring an effect on commerce in the
individual case or use of a channel of interstate commerce such as
travel.24
C. Corruptionas a Civil Rights Problem-A Possible Role for the
FourteenthAmendment

Corruption, especially in a local government, can be viewed as a form
of deprivation of civil rights. 4 Corruption often leads to a skewing in the
provision of goods and services, frequently to the detriment of minority
communities. In addition, local corruption is often the product of
political entrenchment. Again, there is the possibility that discrete and
insular groups will suffer harm at the hands of "their government." Any
such analysis suggests the possibility of a role for the Fourteenth
Amendment. 246 That Amendment is aimed at protecting minorities and
has always been recognized by the Court as altering the federal-state
balance. 247 Moreover, it contains an explicit authorization to Congress to
enact "appropriate" legislation, thus putting it on par with the
enumerated powers of Section 1. 248 (The fact that the Guarantee Clause
contains no such authorization may be an additional problem in viewing
it as a possible source of anti-corruption legislation).
243. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas stated, "Clearly, the Framers could have drafted a Constitution that

contains a 'substantially affects interstate commerce' Clause had that been their
objective." Id. at 588. He also stated that "[iun an appropriate case, I believe that we must
further reconsider our 'substantial effects' test with an eye toward constructing a standard
that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our
more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence." Id. at 585.
244. E.g., Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000).
245. For a discussion of the civil rights rationale, see Brown, supra note 6, at 489-91.

246.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

247.
248.

E.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

2005]

FederalProsecution of State and Local Officials After Sabri

441

There are, however, obvious problems, especially given current
The Amendment clearly
doctrine.
Fourteenth Amendment
contemplates, or establishes the existence of, rights of which states may
not deprive their citizens.2 49 The Constitution does not explicitly provide
a right to good government. The major current battle within Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine is the extent to which Congress can create
statutory rights to supplement those that can be found in the
Constitution. 2 The Court has affirmed that federalism plays a role in
evaluating legislation based on the Amendment. It has apparently
focused on a test which requires the core existence of a constitutional
right, a widespread degree of state violation of that right, and remedial
mechanisms which are "congruent" and "proportional" to the
deprivation. 21' A case can be made that corruption fits this model, but it
is not an easy one. The argument starts from the fact that certain forms
of corruption implicate constitutional rights. Patronage practices can
constitute First Amendment violations. 252 Deprivations of due process
might be found in some cases.253 Certainly Congress would be justified in
taking the additional step of concluding that corruption is widespread in
states and localities. However, it is doubtful that a broad-based anticorruption statute would satisfy current notions of congruence and
proportionality. This is probably a discussion that can be left for another
day, but it does highlight the importance of being able to rely on a
constitutional provision that contemplates federal intervention in state
249. In this respect, the key language of the Amendment is
[nlo State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Id. § 1.
250. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
251. See id. at 519-20, 530, 532. In Flores, Justice Kennedy stated that
[wihile the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not
easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it
lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect.
Id. at 519-20.
252. E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976).
253. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 7, at 555-60 (citing and discussing possible
examples of corruption as deprivations of federal rights); see also Brown, supra note 6, at
486-87 (discussing equality issues); Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1989-1992 (2004)
(discussing equal provision of public services in the context of Fourteenth Amendmentbased legislation). This analysis does not discuss the possibility of corruption issues in
"class of one" cases.
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affairs to achieve a broad national goal. If one of the lessons of the 2003
Term is that corruption trumps federalism, then the Fourteenth
Amendment rationale may well prove worth reexamination.
D. The Spending Power Revisited

Perhaps one may justify § 666 and an even broader anti-corruption
statute on spending power grounds different from those set forth in
Sabri. As stated previously in this Article, why not let Congress say that
its objective is to prevent corruption rather than hide behind the
protection of federal funds? An alternative approach to outlawing
corruption in entities, governmental or not, receiving federal funds would
be based on the work of scholars, such as Professor Hills, who view the
system of substantial federal aid to governments as creating an
"intergovernmental marketplace" in which the National Government
enlists states, localities, and other entities as partners in the provision of
goods and services.] As Professor Hills puts it:
There is a vigorous intergovernmental marketplace in which

municipalities, counties, and states-like private organizations
and persons -compete

with each other for the chance to obtain

federal revenue. Therefore, whenever the national government
values such services enough to pay nonfederal governments the

costs of providing them, the national government can obtain the
cooperation of state or local governments in implementing
federal law."'

Thus it might follow that the Federal Government has the power to
establish the "rules of the game," perhaps to achieve greater efficiency,
perhaps to ensure that the complex set of partnerships it has created is
run according to national values. 6 In theory, the presence of choice-

the possibility of opting out-justifies the imposition of requirements on
recipients including a criminal provision such as § 666, as long as it is
agreed to. Section 666 is not a condition for any specific grant, but it is a
general rule applicable to the entire system. There is less choice, since a
recipient would have to opt out of the entire system, rather than any

particular grant, to avoid the statute. I do not mean to impute support
for this approach to Hills. (He has noted, for example, that the federal

interests in protecting the integrity of the mails or of federal grants can

254. See generally, Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism:Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 813 (1998).
255. Id. at 819.
256. These might be the values that Professor Hills has characterized as "bureaucratic
populism." Hills, supra note 56, at 117-19.
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easily turn into "sheer formalities. ' 257 Perhaps the same thing would
happen to the "rules of the intergovernmental system" rationale.) One
would have to think through the implications of any such rationale.
Certainly the question arises whether a choice-based approach to § 666 is
significantly different from simply imposing it to protect federal funds.
Perhaps it would take us too far-to the point feared by Professor
Garnett where the view prevails that Congress can spend for the general
welfare and can then adopt any law that is necessary and proper to
further the general wetfare 88 I recognize the problem of limits. The
challenge for the nationalist perspective is to lay the basis for a general
anti-corruption statute without reaching into all aspects of state and local
governments. If the spending power is to be used to support a general
anti-corruption statute, the challenge is both to justify that role openly
and to keep alive the prospect of some limits. Perhaps "protecting
federal funds" serves these ends as well as any alternative rationale. At
the very least, however, it must be recognized that there are cases of
corruption in which that end is simply not served.
V. CONCLUSION

During the 2003 Term, the Supreme Court issued two important
decisions aimed at keeping corruption out of government: McConnell v.
FEC and Sabri v. United States. McConnell got all the publicity, but

Sabri is just as significant. Sabri not only validated a sweeping reading of
the federal program bribery statute (18 U.S.C. § 666), but it also focused
on protecting the integrity of state and local governments as the means of
protecting federal funds. The case thus stands as an affirmation of the
federal role in prosecuting state and local officials for political
corruption.
In this Article, I have raised the recurring question whether the
prosecutions are consistent with the Supreme Court's New Federalism.
A strong argument can be made that they are not, but the Court has
established that its anti-corruption imperative trumps federalism. If
Sabri represents a victory for the nationalist view on corruption
prosecution, the question remains whether the spending power -coupled
with the notion of protecting federal funds-is the best route to get there.
There are alternative constitutional and statutory possibilities for a
general anti-corruption statute. Sabri's greatest strength may be that it
takes us to the point where we can deal with the matter openly.

257.
258.

Id. at 151 n.82.
Garnett, supranote 93, at 82.
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